Procedure: Evidence by Howerton, Huey B.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 11 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1949-1950 Term
January 1951
Procedure: Evidence
Huey B. Howerton
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Huey B. Howerton, Procedure: Evidence, 11 La. L. Rev. (1951)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol11/iss2/20
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of jurisprudence under the present as well as previous constitu-
tions containing similarly worded provisions has justified such
an interpretation as a demand of due process of law. The sound-
ness of this conclusion has been seriously questioned previously
in these pages .2  Having established their rights to challenge the
validity of the tax sale in this fashion, the plaintiffs were then
permitted to succeed by showing that the property had been
assessed and sold in the name of their father who had died some
ten years prior to the year of tax delinquency and without being
required to show any genuine prejudice. This is another aspect
of tax sale annullment which has been seriously questioneds.2
Finally, plaintiffs were allowed the relief requested despite the
fact that previous authoritative adjudications of the same court
had held that they did not in fact own the land in dispute, but
were, at best, possessors in good faith within the meaning of
Article 3451 of the Civil Code, title to the property having been
clearly determined to be vested in others. Justice McCaleb in a
dissent, in which he was joined by Justice LeBlanc, saw no valid
reason for the extension of the doctrine that peremption is sus-
pended by corporeal possession by the owner of the property.
The writer shares this view, particularly in view of the doubtful
propriety of the original proposition.
III. Procedure
EVIDENCE
Huey B. Howerton*
For good or ill, exclusionary rules of evidence retain their
vitality in Louisiana criminal cases. Civil cases in which an evi-
dence point is raised on appeal are negligible. In the holdings
which follow, all criminal cases, no novel or startling problems
of evidence present themselves. But the decisions of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court on evidence questions illustrate graphically
the judicial process ceaselessly at work in attempting to recon-
cile the irreconcilable demands of order for the community, and
liberty for the citizen.
27. Fordham and Hunter, supra note 23 at 464-467.
28. Id. at 468.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S OTHER CRIMES; PRESUMPTION
OF GOOD CHARACTER
An accused is required to answer only to the crime with
which he is charged in the indictment, and the state is forbidden
initially to attack his character. The necessity of allowing the
state to make out its case has resulted in establishment of a num-
ber of specific exceptions to the rule, that is, when the other
crimes are offered as part of the res gestae,' or to prove identity,2
intent,3 motive,4 or common scheme or plan.5 Relevant evidence
can always be offered by the state and is to be rejected only when
its single tendency is to show accused's bad character.6
Four recent supreme court decisions concerned admissibility
of evidence of other crimes, in two cases offered as part of the
res gestae, and in two others offered to prove intent or motive.
State v. Alexander7 was a prosecution of defendant for commit-
ting incest with his daughter. On cross-examination accused was
asked whether he had had intercourse previously with another
daughter, and whether he had also tried to attack his step-
daughter. He answered both questions in the negative; the state
in rebuttal produced the two women, who testified that he had
had intercourse with the daughter and had attempted it with the
stepdaughter. On appeal the state contended that evidence of
the acts with other daughters was admissible to show accused's
criminal intent. The court disagreed and held that the elements
of incest "are the intercourse coupled with a knowledge of the
relationship." With intent the court was not here concerned,9
and thus the evidence of other crimes was not to be allowed.
Here the evidence offered was of acts with a daughter other
than the one named in the indictment, and generally such evi-
dence is rejected. But evidence of previous acts committed by
accused with the same daughter is a different matter, and is
usually admitted.10
Res gestae is a phrase that can be translated easily enough
1. State v. Jugger, 47 So. 2d 46 (La. 1950); State v. Sears, 217 La. 47, 46
So. 2d 34 (1950); Arts. 447, 448, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
2. State v. Wales, 168 La. 322, 122 So. 52 (1929).
3. State v. Stewart, 157 La. 494, 102 So. 584 (1924).
4. Ibid.
5. State v. Jackson, 163 La. 34, 111. So. 486 (1927). See also Arts. 445, 446,
La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
6. 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 300 et seq. (3 ed. 1940).
7. 216 La. 932, 45 So. 2d 83 (1950).
8. 216 La. 932, 939, 45 So. 2d 83, 85 (1950).
9. Art. 446, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
10. State v. Grantham, 150 La. 621, 91 So. 66 (1922); State v. De Hart, 109
La. 570, 33 So. 605 (1903).
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but defined only with difficulty. "Thing done" is the literal
meaning; circumstances connected with the particular fact under
investigation is usually the idea underlying the definition of the
phrase." It has been suggested that the phrase is cumbersome
and that its use should be abandoned. 1 2 Chief objection is that
standing alone it is meaningless; invariably an explanatory
clause must accompany the phrase to give it meaning. To illus-
trate: "If evidence of the commission of another crime consti-
tutes a part of the res gestae, it is admissible," from Wharton's
Criminal Evidence,'3 tells us nothing, when one is looking for an
answer to the question whether such evidence is admissible.
Equally valueless is the last sentence in Article 447 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, "What forms any part of the res gestae
is always admissible in evidence."
Examples of the necessity of explaining the phrase each time
it is used are these two quotations, one from Wharton and one
from Marr, the latter quoted by the supreme court: "[Proof of
a different crime is allowed] where the offense is so closely con-
nected with the crime as to bring it within the rule of res
gestae,'u 4 and, "when both offenses are closely linked and consti-
tute a part of the res gestae ... ."' The problem in each case is
not deciding whether the other crime is so closely connected with
the crime-in-issue as to bring it within the rule of res gestae; the
problem is deciding whether the other crime is closely connected
period; that is, the question to be answered is relevancy. For a
satisfactory determination of this issue, there need be no refer-
ence to the artificial and ambiguous categorization, res gestae.
In State v. Sears,'6 accused was charged with murder of his
mother-in-law in his apartment. Shortly after the alleged homi-
cide occurred, police officers found a marijuana cigarette on
accused's dresser. Although this showed defendant guilty of a
different crime, the trial judge permitted evidence of the finding
as "part of the res gestae." The supreme court held this was
error. It is interesting to notice that the opinion first specified
the reasons for not allowing the evidence; there was no showing
by the state that it was offered to establish malice, motive, or
intent; and it was not connected with the crime of murder in any
causal relation. That is, plainly the evidence, offered was not
11. State v. Sears, 217 La. 47, 46 So. 2d 34 (1950).
12. 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1757 (3 ed. 1940).
13. Wharton, Criminal Evidence, § 345 (11 ed. 1935).
14. Id. at § 213.
15. State v. Guillory, 201 La. 52, 9 So. 2d 450 (1942).
16. 217 La. 47, 46 So. 2d 34 (1950).
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relevant. And then the court concludes: "but under the cir-
cumstances of the instant case, as set out hereinabove, it clearly
was not admissible as part of the res gestae ... "I'
In State v. Jugger'8 defendants were charged with rape and
had stolen jewelry from the house where the crime was com-
mitted. The court approved admission in evidence of the stolen
articles, for "it is well settled that evidence of a different crime
from the one charged may be received when both offenses are
closely linked and so as to form part of the res gestae."'9 (Italics
supplied.)
A case in which the evidence was wholly circumstantial was
State v. Dowdy.20 There, one Dorman was killed under mysteri-
ous circumstances when his cabin was dynamited; and defen-
dants, father and son, were charged with murder. At the trial
evidence was admitted of proposals made by defendants to vari-
ous persons; these schemes called for obtaining an insurance
policy, faking the death of the insured, .and then collecting ille-
gally. Defendants objected that this evidence tended only to
impeach their character, but the supreme court held that the
appropriate sections 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were
broad enough to justify admission. Justice LeBlanc stated that
the schemes for defrauding the insurance companies tended to
show the motive or object of accused in dynamiting deceased's
cabin. They tended to explain an otherwise inexplicable occur-
rence. It should be noted that the two code sections authorize
evidence of other acts for the purpose of showing intent; neither
section uses the word motive. Thus, the court appears to be hold-
ing that evidence offered to show motive also has a tendency to
establish accused's state of mind at the time of the crime.-
In State v. Winey,22 accused offered no evidence of his repu-
tation but requested a charge to the jury that "the law presumes
that she has a fair and respectable character." The judge refused
the charge; on appeal accused relied on Underhill. 23 The supreme
court stated that Underhill is wrong, that its previous holding
17. 46 So. 2d 34, 37 (La. 1950).
18. 47 So. 2d 46 (La. 1950).
19. Id. at 53.
20. 47 So. 2d 496 (La. 1950).
21. Arts. 445, 446, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
22. 216 La. 560, 44 So. 2d 115 (1950)..
23. "If, however, he offers no evidence of good character, the law presumes
he has a fair and respectable, if not, indeed, an excellent character ....
Underhill, Criminal Evidence (4 ed. 1935) § 165. Few cases are cited by this
authority to substantiate this statement, and the very first case referred to
holds that in the absence of proof, there is no presumption either way as to
character. Steele v. State, 19 Ala. App. 598, 99 So. 745 (1924).
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contradicts him,2 4 that Professor Wigmore has approved the Loui-
siana rule, and therefore, the supreme court approves Professor
Wigmore. The rule reaffirmed in State v. Winey is that there is
no presumption and accused's reputation is a "non-existent quan-
tity in the evidence. '25 It comes into the evidence only when
defendant through his character witnesses brings it in. This hold-
ing clearly appears to be the majority view.2 6
CONFESSIONS
Admissibility of confessions is a much-litigated matter in
Louisiana and the rules are fairly well settled.27 Generally, a
confession is involuntary and thus inadmissible when made
under hope of reward or benefit held out to accused by a person
in authority, or when obtained by duress, threats or fear. 28 Un-
trustworthiness is the criterion; and in theory. at least, a true con-
fession obtained by torture will never be rejected solely because
of the violence employed. 29
The Louisiana Constitution ordains that an arrested person
shall not be treated in any way designed to extract a confession,30
and the statutes require that the state show affirmatively that the
alleged confession was voluntary before it is received in evi-
dence.8 1 A distinction is drawn between an admission. and a
confession;8 2 and if the statement offered in evidence is only the
admission of an incriminating fact not disclosing criminal intent,
24. State v. Davis, 154 La. 295, 97 So. 449 (1908).
25. 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 290 (3 ed. 1940).
26. Ibid.
27. See, generally, Arts. 449-455, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928. Pres-
ently pending in the supreme court is State v. Alleman, No. 39,992, on an
appeal from the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, which presents a question
not yet passed on in Louisiana. Accused was arrested, charged with murder
and placed in the Lafayette parish jail. He was interrogated by several
police officials in the sheriff's office, and he confessed to the crime. Hanging
on the wall back of the accused was a microphone, by which his confession
was recorded on a machine in the next room. This was done without accused's
knowledge. At the trial the record of this confession was played to the jury,
the judge holding the record admissible despite accused's objection.
The specific question as to admissibility of a wire-recorded confession
has been passed on in few cases; but where passed on, the question is usually
decided in favor of admission. See Note, 168 A.L.R. 927 (1947). The supreme
court must reconcile conflicting policies. Admission of recorded confessions
is desirable because the jury can know directly all that occurred while the
confession was being obtained. Opposed is the possibility that the state's
officials might be tempted to offer fabricated records of confessions that were
never received, or perhaps, by the use of modern tape-recording procedure,
to present only the incriminatinug portions of the record and omit any excul-
patory statements.
28. 3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 822 et seq. (3 ed. 1940).
29. Wilson v. State, 19 Ga. App. 759, 92 S.E. 309 (1917).
30. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 11.
31. Arts. 451, 452, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
32. Id. at Art. 449.
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
it may be admitted even though it was coerced in a manner
which would require rejection of a confession.33 The supreme
court is well aware that Louisiana law enforcement officials are
saved much effort by an accused's confessing. It has consistently
interpreted these statutes to place a heavy burden on the state,
and many decisions have been rendered holding that the testi-
mony adduced by the state must show not merely affirmatively
but beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was obtained
voluntarily.3 4
Six recent cases decided by the supreme court were concerned
mainly with the, question whether the state had carried the bur-
den and the confession was thus admissible. In only one of these,
State v. Honeycutt,3 5 did the court hold that the state at the pre-
liminary hearing had failed to show the voluntariness of the
offered confession. Honeycutt was arrested and put in jail at
6:30 in the evening. His confession was given and taken down
the next morning at 7:30 in the presence of a deputy sheriff and
several police officers. These witnesses for the state on the hear-
ing as to admissibility all testified that no force or threats were
used when the confession was given at this time. But defen-
dant's story at the hearing was that, the night before the confes-
sion was given, he was beaten and threats were made to return
him to the community where the rape occurred. He admitted
that he was not beaten in the morning when the confession was
taken down in the presence of the several officials, but stated
that the beatings the night before caused him to confess then;
and on the morning after, his confession at that time was merely
a reduction to writing of what he had stated the previous eve-
ning. The state's only testimony as to what occurred at the time
defendant said he was beaten was that of a deputy sheriff, al-
though there were five other officers present at the jail at this
time.
The specific question to be decided by the court was whether
the state's failure to call one or more of these five witnesses to
corroborate the deputy sheriff's testimony created a reasonable
doubt as to the voluntariness of the alleged confession. Some or
all of these witnesses should have been called, the court decided.
The trial judge admitted the confession because he did not think
33. Id. at Art. 454; State v. Terrell, 175 La. 758, 144 So. 488 (1932).
34. State v. Honeycutt, 216 La. 610, 44 So. 2d 313 (1950); State v. Jugger,
47 So. 2d 46 (La. 1950); State v. Wilson, 214 La. 317, 37 So. 2d 804 (1948); State
v. Ross, 212 La. 405, 31 So. 2d 842 (1947); State v. Ellis, 207 La. 812, 22 So. 2d
181 (1945).
35. 216 La. 610, 44 So. 2d 313 (1950).
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the accused worthy of belief. But merely disbelieving an ac-
cused's testimony is not enough to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, or even affirmatively, that a confession was voluntarily
obtained. The court concluded that its decision was a holding
only that the state had not presented enough evidence to show
voluntariness and was not to be interpreted as a finding that the
confession was obtained involuntarily. Thus, the state at the new
trial would be allowed to put on additional witnesses as to volun-
tariness, if it could find them.""
Frequently an accused in custody confesses not once, but
several times. Assuming that the first of his confessions is ob-
tained under circumstances rendering it inadmissible because
involuntary, will the trial judge hold that the fatality of the
first vitiates all the rest? The problem arose in State v. Jugger.37
Jugger and Washington were arrested and charged with aggra-
vated rape; they confessed orally five times and gave one written
confession. At the trial the judge excluded the first three oral
statements and admitted the others. The first confession was
given by Washington to two deputy sheriffs, after they had
urged him to "come clean and tell the truth," and it would "be
better for him." The second resulted when a deputy the next
day in jail told Jugger he would get a fair trial if he told his part,
and the third statement was given by both men the next night in
jail in the presence of two brothers-in-law of the murder victim,
together with a detective and the jailer. The trial judge felt there
existed sufficient inducement or coercion in each instance to
render the offered evidence objectionable.
Oral confessions four and five came when the two defen-
dants were being transferred by two deputies from the Harahan
jail to the Gretna jail. The group stopped at two different Negro
saloons, and at each a deputy called out the colored manager who
knew the defendants. When the manager confronted both the
accused, the deputy suggested that they tell the Negro what hap-
pened; and in each instance defendants told the full story. At the
hearing on the admissibility of these two statements all witnesses
present at each saloon including several colored bystanders testi-
fied that the statements were given voluntarily; defendants put
on no witnesses at all.
On appeal defendants argued that the trial judge should have
excluded all of the confessions because the first three were invol-
36. Honeycutt has since been tried and found guilty, and his appeal is
pending.
37. 47 So. 2d 46 (La. 1950).
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untary. The supreme court did not agree and approved admissi-
bility of the last two oral confessions. It stated that the rule that
conditions inducing involuntary confessions are presumed to
continue is not even applicable here. The trial judge's exclu-
sion of the first three confessions was not a finding that they were
involuntary, but only that the state had failed to establish affirm-
atively to the judge's satisfaction that the confessions were un-
coerced. 8 No presumption as to involuntariness of subsequent
confessions arises simply from the failure of the state to convince
the judge of the voluntariness of prior confessions. Especially is
this true in an instance such as here, where accused offered no
testimony that the first three confessions were obtained involun-
tarily.39
State v. Joseph40 and State v. Wilson 41 are recent cases of
interest. In each a confession was given by accused, and in each
it was established plainly that some time after arrest he had been
subjected to some, though slight, physical violence. In both cases,
however, the supreme court believed that the mistreatment in no
way contributed to the giving of the confession and that the con-
fessions were properly admitted. That a confession and an in-
stance of violence are found to co-exist in a legal proceeding
against an accused does not require the inference that the one
was the cause of the other. The existence of the cause-and-effect
relation will not be assumed by the court and defendant must
testify at least to its existence in order to create a reasonable
doubt as to voluntariness of the confession.
REAL EVIDENCE
Under what conditions may the state in murder prosecutions
introduce photographs of the deceased? Is gruesomeness a ground
for rejection, even though the photographs will enlighten the
jury? In several cases the supreme court has answered these
questions. 42 It has stated that photographs of the deceased may
be admitted after proper identification and when made by an
expert photographer, for the purpose of showing the nature of
the crime, the corpus delicti, to assist witnesses in their testi-
mony, or to give the jury a better understanding of the nature of
38. Compare the similar holding in the Honeycutt case, 216 La. 610, 44
So. 2d 313 (1950).
39. 47 So. 2d 46, 53 (1950).
40. 217 La. 175, 46 So. 2d 118 (1950).
41. 217 La. 470, 46 So. 2d 738 (1950).
42. State v. Messer, 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633 (1940); State v. Henry, 197 La.
999, 3 So. 2d 104 (1941); State v. Johnson, 198 La. 195, 3 So. 2d 556 (1941);
State v. Morgan, 211 La. 572, 30 So. 2d 434 (1947).
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deceased's wounds.43 Specifically, the photographs are admitted
in order to show the position of the body, the scene of the crime,
and the place of penetration of bullet or knife.44 The photographs
of the body may present a gruesome spectacle; but if they are
offered for an admittedly legitimate purpose, such as these just
stated, they are not to be rejected because their incidental effect
is prejudice of defendant in the eyes of the jury.45 But if the
pictures are inflammatory and prejudicial and are not relevant
to any fact in issue at the time of their introduction, they are not
admissible. 46
In State v. Morgan,47 two gruesome photographs of the body
were offered by the state, but not until after the state had put on
the coroner and had him testify as to the corpus delicti and the
nature of deceased's wounds. The court held that the preju-
dicial pictures were to be excluded, because they were immaterial
since offered for the proof of facts which had already been estab-
lished.
48
In two recent cases, State v. Dowdy49 and State v. Ross,50
defendant objected to the photographs, in the one case of rem-
nants of a corpse and in the other of deceased's bloody face and
chest, on the ground that they were prejudicial and not related
to any fact in issue. In each, defendant relied on the ruling in
the Morgan case, and in each the court held the case was not
controlling. In Dowdy, the court, through Justice LeBlanc, held
that the photograph of a human foot (the decedent having been
done away with by dynamite) was clearly admissible for the
purpose of identifying deceased. State v. Morgan does not inter-
fere, the court said, for its rule is merely the converse of the
present holding, and requires exclusion when the "gruesome
photograph is not at all necessary or material evidence in a
criminal prosecution. 51  Here there was a fact, identity, to be
established and the photograph was relevant. And to make
43. Ibid.
44. State v. Henry, 197 La. 999, 3 So. 2d 104 (1941).
45. State v. Johnson, 198 La. 195, 3 So. 2d 556 (1941).
46. State v. Morgan, 211 La. 572, 30 So. 2d 434 (1947).
47. Ibid.
48. Two judges dissented in the Morgan case and relied on the previous
holding in State v. Johnson, 198 La. 195, 3 So. 2d 556 (1941), which allowed
the gruesome photographs to be admitted in evidence in corroboration of the
testimony of the coroner. Defendant in the Johnson case had objected to
the photographs, arguing that the coroner alone could describe the wounds
and establish the corpus delicti, but the court there overruled him and said
the photographs also helped establish the corpus delicti.
49. 47 So. 2d 496 (La. 1950).
50. 47 So. 2d 559 (La. 1950).
51. 47 So. 2d 496, 505 (La. 1950).
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admission of the photographs clearly correct, the court concluded
that the picture of the foot was not gruesome at all.
In State v. Ross, 52 defendant argued that the coroner had
already testified to and established the corpus delicti when the
gruesome photographs were offered, thus requiring rejection of
the pictures. This was the argument raised and acceded to by
the court in the Morgan case. But here, the court said, a different
situation was presented. Two of the three allegedly gruesome
photographs were not offensive; the third showing the bloody
face and chest of deceased was "somewhat repellent," but had it
been plainly gruesome it would still have been admissible, for it
was relevant to the establishment of an important fact-in-issue.
Defendant claimed the killing was in self-defense; and contrary
to defendant's statement that deceased held a pistol at the time,
the picture showed him holding a pencil in his right hand.5 3 This
was the disputed fact to which the admission of the photograph
was clearly relevant.
REPUTATION OF DECEASED
State v. Basco 54 was a murder prosecution in which defen-
dant pleaded self-defense. At the trial his offer of evidence of
deceased's reputation was rejected. The supreme court approved,
stating that defendant had failed to establish an overt act or
hostile demonstration on the part of the deceased at the time of
the shooting.5 5 Defendant's testimony was that he had shot at a
hawk; a rifle was then fired at him, and he had shot in the direc-
tion of the sound of the rifle. In view of the fact that deceased
was found shot in the back, the trial judge took a dim view of
defendant's story, and did not believe that deceased had com-
mitted the overt act, thus requiring rejection of evidence of de-
ceased's reputation. The supreme court agreed that defendant's
story was weak and added that the trial court in determining
whether the overt act was done may exercise a wide discretion
and disbelieve anyone it wishes.56 This holding is in accord with
many previous decisions.5 7
52. 47 So. 2d 559 (La. 1950).
53. 47 So. 2d 559, 560 (La. 1950).
54. 216 La. 365, 43 So. 2d 761 (1950).
55. "In the absence of proof of hostile demonstration or of overt act on
the part of the person slain or injured, evidence of his dangerous character
or of his threats against accused is not admissible." Art. 482, La. Code of
Crim. Proc. of 1928.
56. 216 La. 365, 371, 43 So. 2d 761, 763 (1949).
57. State v. Pullen, 130 La. 249, 57 So. 906 (1912); State v. Richardson,
175 La. 823, 144 So. 587 (1932); State v. Washington, 184 La. 544, 166 So. 669
(1936); State v. Scott, 198 La. 162, 3 So. 2d 545 (1941).
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Generally, evidence of deceased's reputation on a plea of self-
defense in a murder prosecution is offered for one of two distinct
but occasionally undifferentiated reasons: to explain defendant's
action as reasonable because resulting from his knowledge that
deceased had a reputation for violence, and second, to allow the
jury to infer that deceased was the aggressor, since he had a
reputation for violence, even though defendant had no knowl-
edge of this reputation.58 Many courts hold that the proper
foundation for admission of deceased's reputation consists in
presenting first, evidence that defendant knew of the reputation,
and second, evidence that deceased was the aggressor. As to this
second criterion, the majority of courts rule that this evidence
need only tend to show the aggression of deceased. But on this
point of requiring evidence of aggression to justify admitting
evidence of reputation, Louisiana under Article 48251 goes much
further. Showing deceased was the aggressor is insufficient; the
judge must be convinced that deceased actually committed an
overt act, such as pulling a knife. It has been argued repeatedly
by Chief Justice O'Niell that the trial judge's deciding this issue
violates defendant's constitutional right of trial by jury. 0 But
the majority of the court have never agreed with him. Justice
O'Niell's view is that the trial court's function is limited to the
determination whether the evidence offered tends to establish
the fact-in-issue, that is, logical relevancy, and is unconcerned
with the question whether the evidence offered establishes the
fact-in-issue, which is properly a jury function.
EXAMINATION AND CROss-ExAMINATION
REBUTTAL
The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a witness
"intentionally sworn" and testifying in chief to a single fact may
be cross-examined upon the whole case,"1 and also that an ac-
cused who takes the stand is to be treated as any other witness
and may be cross-examined upon the whole case. 2 In State v.
Angelle,6 3 the statute was applied to a witness; and in State v.
Jugger,64 the rule was used against a party defendant.
The Angelle case involved a deputy sheriff's testimony in the
58. Note, 64 A.L.R. 1022, 1029 (1929).
59. See Note 55, supra.
60. See his opinion in State v. Richardson, 175 La. 823, 144 So. 587 (1932).
61. Art. 376, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
62. Id. at Art. 462.
63. 47 So. 2d 664 (La. 1950).
64. 47 So. 2d 46 (La. 1950).
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course of a manslaughter prosecution that he had obtained a
voluntary statement from the accused in jail. Counsel for the
accused sought to show that the statement when obtained had
not been written down but was later typed out from memory,
and on cross-examination asked the deputy whether he had had
pencil and paper or a typewriter with him in the jail cell. The
trial judge ruled that the witness could not be asked this ques-
tion, since on his direct examination he had not testified that the
statement was taken down in writing. This was error, the su-
preme court said, citing Article 376. When the deputy testified
that he had obtained the statement, accused had the right to
cross-examine him as to all the circumstances under which the
statement was made. He was to be subjected to questions on the
whole case, which included the particular fact to which the wit-
ness had testified in chief.
In the Jugger case, in which several confessions were offered
in evidence, the state rested its case; and accused asked to be
allowed to take the stand for the sole purpose of showing that
the confessions were obtained under duress. The court held that
not allowing him to do so was correct. Article 462 requires
accused as a witness to be subjected to complete cross-exam-
ination.65
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right of one charged with a federal felony to have the
assistance of counsel to aid in his defense is provided for in the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The consti-
tutions of the various states, including that of Louisiana,' contain
similar provisions. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
further provides that it shall be the duty of the court to assign
counsel in cases when a defendant charged with a felony makes
an affidavit that he is unable to procure such legal assistance.2
While it is well settled that failure to appoint counsel upon
request constitutes reversible error, the court need not appoint
counsel for the defendant unless he requests it. A related ques-
tion, which has given courts in Louisiana and other states con-
65. Id. at 55.
1. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9. Similar provisions are found in earlier
Louisiana constitutions beginning with Art. VI, § 18, of the Constitution
of 1812.
2. Art. 143, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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